{"id":196078,"date":"2024-07-18T12:30:12","date_gmt":"2024-07-18T12:30:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ibkrcampus.eu\/?p=196078"},"modified":"2024-07-18T13:27:40","modified_gmt":"2024-07-18T13:27:40","slug":"what-were-the-major-governance-trends-at-the-2024-proxy-season","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.interactivebrokers.eu\/campus\/traders-insight\/what-were-the-major-governance-trends-at-the-2024-proxy-season\/","title":{"rendered":"What were the major governance trends at the 2024 proxy season?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As the 2024 proxy season draws to a close, Schroders\u2019 Corporate Governance team reflects on some of the trends and highlights across global markets this year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Originally Posted, 12 July 2024 – What were the major governance trends at the 2024 proxy season?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

UK: discussions on the competitiveness of UK capital markets drum on<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The 2024 UK proxy season has been a year of consolidation, with many of the new remuneration policies approved by shareholders at last year\u2019s AGMs coming into effect. It has also been a reflective period as both companies and shareholders digest the Financial Reporting Council\u2019s changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code and debates around the competitiveness of the UK\u2019s capital markets continue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One aspect of these discussions has been the importance of executive pay in ensuring that the UK remains an attractive arena for companies to list on the stock market and grow over the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There has been, as a result, increasing support for higher executive pay packages. An example of this is pharmaceutical giant, AstraZeneca. The company put forward a new remuneration policy for shareholder approval at the AGM which received 64.43% support. The new policy proposed concurrent increases to both the CEO\u2019s bonus opportunity and long-term incentive award. If both awards are earned at maximum, it could result in as much as a c.30% increase to the CEO\u2019s total remuneration package.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our view is that executive pay should be aligned to company performance and reflective of the shareholder experience. We were, therefore, in the camp that was supportive of AstraZeneca\u2019s remuneration policy because, firstly, we believe that the current CEO has done an excellent job and delivered value to shareholders. Secondly, the higher incentive opportunities reflect the global environment in which the company operates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, in our engagement with the company, we communicated that we would like to see the performance targets become more challenging year-on-year for the maximum level of the awards to be earned. Secondly, we asked that in the event that there\u2019s a change in CEO, the new CEO should be appointed on a lower package until they have delivered performance that warrants the higher levels. The company was receptive to our views, and we look forward to future constructive discussions with the Board.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We also saw shareholders approve board proposals at UK listed banks who sought to remove the bonus cap, in line with the Bank of England\u2019s ruling last year. HSBC led the way, receiving over 90% support from shareholders to lift the cap, followed by Lloyds Banking Group. companies and shareholders continue to grapple with striking a balance between responsible stewardship and attracting and retaining top talent, it\u2019s likely we will continue to see UK Plcs look to other markets, particularly the US, to model their future remuneration policies in respect to both quantum and structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

North America: watershed year for shareholder resolutions and activism<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This year was another watershed year for shareholder resolutions filed at North American companies. Proposals focused on topics from climate and natural capital to human rights, corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance. Political lobbying and spending were also commonplace on meeting agendas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Resolutions that are critical of the value delivered to shareholders by addressing ESG risks, known as \u2018anti-ESG\u2019 resolutions, have also been filed. An increased focus on AI, shareholder rights and biodiversity topics were welcome trends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, on shareholder rights, we co-filed a shareholder resolution <\/a>at Meta which called for the disclosure of the voting results on matters subject to a shareholder vote according to the class of shares, namely differentiating between those shares carrying one voting right and those carrying multiple voting rights. Since the company has not been willing to eliminate or phase-out its dual-class stock structure, we believe that it should at least provide more transparency over how proposals are voted on by independent and non-independent shareholders. Unfortunately, the resolution did not pass at the AGM, due to the dual class structure. It did, however, receive significant support from independent shareholders and we will continue to engage with the company on this topic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Activist shareholder activity also gained momentum in 2024. High-profile, activist campaigns, whilst not always ultimately successful, have resulted in heightened scrutiny of existing directors\u2019 performance and corporate strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the highly anticipated activist campaigns this year was at Disney, a company that has been associated with problematic corporate governance and poor performance in recent years. The campaign was two-pronged; firstly, the well-known activist firm, Trian Partners, sought to elect one of their founding partners and the former CFO of Disney to the board of directors to replace two incumbent directors. Another activist, Blackwell Capital, also launched a campaign to elect three directors to Disney\u2019s board.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The nature of proxy contests is that they can cause unhelpful conflict between the board and the activists so that even if the activists campaign succeeds, it might result in a hostile boardroom and make the desired reform harder to achieve. We therefore carefully consider a variety of factors when deciding how to vote at proxy contests, even when we share the dissidents\u2019 position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We did not support any of Trian\u2019s or Blackwell\u2019s candidates. Nevertheless, to signal our dissatisfaction with the board and management, we voted against the re-election of the current chair, and all the members of the compensation committee. This is not to say that the proxy contest itself lacked value. Proxy contests can be a helpful catalyst to the board addressing the concerns at the centre of these debates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe: Shareholder rights faced challenges across the region<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In Switzerland, share blocking has been a significant issue throughout this year\u2019s AGM season. Share blocking means that once the shares have been voted or are being registered to vote, the shareholders can no longer trade these shares until after the shareholder meeting. This practice hinders stock liquidity and investors\u2019 ability to respond to changing market conditions or adjusting their investment strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this case, the issue stemmed from the share blocking practices of a specific local agent in the market which imposed process requirements that created significant barriers for investors in exercising their voting rights and participating in corporate governance decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This practice also created an imbalance between the rights of investors who utilized the specific local agent and those who used alternative agents in the markets and, therefore, could continue to freely trade their shares.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Schroders, along with a group of other concerned investors, successfully engaged with the custodian to voice these concerns. Further to the pressure from shareholders, the custodian changed its policy, resulting in all shareholders being able to exercise their voting rights. This engagement, whilst not directly related to voting at a specific AGM, was pivotal to this year\u2019s Swiss proxy season, demonstrating the importance of constructive dialogue with all stakeholders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Italy, the pending introduction of the Italian Capital Markets Bill has raised concern for shareholders. The new Bill is aimed at strengthening Italy\u2019s capital markets by improving its competitiveness and attractiveness for new initial public offerings (IPOs).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, some of the proposals included in the Bill are less beneficial to shareholders. These include shareholder loyalty initiatives and closed-door general meetings, which in turn, weaken shareholders\u2019 rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lastly, executive remuneration continues to be the topic that generates the most votes against Board proposals. So far, we have voted against over one third of remuneration proposals in 2024. A key reason for this is because disclosure of performance targets at European companies remains weak. We have also toughened our approach to assessing targets. For example, like in the US, we expect the threshold vesting levels for relative total shareholder return to be at least median relative to the selected peer group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Asia: Focus on capital efficiency<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Following an increased focus by Japanese companies on capital allocation last year, we are now seeing this trend flow across Asia, with a wave of share buyback programmes and higher dividend payout ratios across the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

South Korea is one market that has followed suit through the introduction of a \u201cValue Up Programme\u201d, aimed at improving company valuations and unlocking lost capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result of this initiative, and a similar one in Japan, we have seen a rise in shareholder activism and resolutions filed at companies in these markets. The focus of these campaigns has largely been on shareholders urging companies to address inefficient balance sheets and capital misallocation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We have tended to be supportive of shareholder resolutions that seek to address these concerns in the following circumstances:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– Where a company has not disclosed plans to address said issues;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– Where the company continues to operate significantly below book value;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– When the company does not have a reasonable shareholder remuneration policy in place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In China, we\u2019ve been keeping a close eye on the Supervisory Board of listed companies as well as their external auditors. When less than one-third of the Supervisory Board comprises independent supervisors, we have been voting against the non-independent ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In line with China Securities Regulatory Commissions’ new guidance on auditor tenure, we have also taken a tougher stance on external auditors at state-owned enterprises, voting against their re-appointment when they have been in place for more than eight years. These changes are reflective of the need for more robust independent oversight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any reference to stocks is for illustrative purposes only and not a recommendation to buy or sell.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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